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Introduction  
 
Islamic history records two accounts of emigration by earlier Muslims during the time 
of Prophet Muhammad in Mecca. The first emigration was to Abyssinia or Ethiopia followed 
by the second (and also the last) to Yathrib, the ancient name of Medina. These emigrations 
were undertaken to avoid persecution by the pagan Quraish over differences in religious 
beliefs. Many traditional Muslim scholars view the second hijra to Medina as a relocation of 
Muslims from Dār ul-Kufr (the land of kufr or disbelief as Mecca was then regarded) to Dār 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman, Email: issaifulalam@ntu.edu.sg 
Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 
Abstract 
From Al-Qaeda to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and now the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) or the so-called Islamic State (IS), hijra (Arabic for emigration), has 
been exploited by these groups to justify their call for Muslims all over the world 
to emigrate to Dār al-Islām or abode of Islam. Historically and in the Islamic 
context, hijra refers to the earlier generation of Muslims who left Mecca for 
Abyssinia as well as Prophet Muhammad’s emigration to Medina. This paper 
focuses on the notion of hijra as interpreted by ISIS to draw Muslims to Iraq and 
Syria to strengthen its rank and file. It argues that the modern jihadists’ 
interpretation of hijra is a misrepresentation of the two earlier emigrations. More 
importantly, it fails to satisfy the Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah or the objectives of 
Sharīʿah law. This paper will make a critical analysis of the concept of hijra from 
the perspective of Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah, and offer an ideological rebuttal 
strategy to counter ISIS’s call for hijra.  It will also attempt to address the 
ideological flaws in the call which foreign terrorist fighters (or FTF) are unaware 
of. 
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ul-Islam (abode of Islam which was Medina).2  These migrations have been exploited by 
terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda (AQ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and ISIS to justify their calls 
for Muslims all over the world to emigrate to their controlled territories to join ranks and fight 
alongside them or to become a member of their community. In its bid to lure global Muslim 
emigration, ISIS focused on hijra as the main theme in its third issue of its monthly online 
publication Dabiq. These developments give rise to the question whether Muslims today, and 
to a certain degree ISIS, observe hijra the way it was understood by the Prophet and 
subsequent generations of Muslim jurists and scholars. 
Contemporary Muslim scholars have challenged ISIS in the ideological front. In the 
“Open Letter to Baghdadi” a group of Muslim scholars (2014) rejected the legitimacy of the 
so-called caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State citing theological grounds. In a 
media interview, Al-Qaradawi3 maintained that ISIS’ declaration of its caliphate was in 
opposition to Sharīʿah law (Al Arabiya, 2014). Al-Yaqoubi4 (2015) stressed that ISIS 
atrocities such as kidnapping, killing of prisoners and torture did not represent true Islam. 
However, ISIS consistently claim that its practices are in compliance with Sharīʿah law and 
attempts to substantiate its arguments by citing the Quran, Hadith (prophetic saying) and 
Sunna (prophetic tradition and practice). A close examination of ISIS’ claims will prove that 
                                                 
2 Traditional Muslim scholars’ understanding of Dār al-Kufr and Dār al-Islam deduced from a Hadith (prophetic 
saying) albeit Prophet Muhammad himself didn’t literally use the term. In a long hadith that underlines the 
specific conduct of Muslim armies during warfare, Sulaimân bin Buraidah narrated that his father said: “When 
the Messenger of Allah appointed commanders for an army or expedition, he would advise them personally to 
fear Allah, exalted and glorified is He, and to be good to those of the Muslims who were under their command. 
Then he said: “Fight in the Name of Allah, for the sake of Allah. Fight those who disbelieve in Allah. Fight but 
do not steal from the war booty, do not break your promises, do not mutilate (the dead enemy) and do not kill 
children. When you meet your enemy among the idolaters, offer them three options, and whichever one they 
choose, accept it from them and refrain from (fighting) them. Invite them to Islam and if they respond, then 
accept it from them and refrain from (fighting) them. Then invite them to migrate from their land to the land of 
the Muhâjirīn (Al-Medinah), and tell them that if they do that, they will have the same rights and duties as the 
Muhâjirīn have.”” Reported by Muslim. 
3 Yusof Al-Qaradawi is a prominent Egyptian sunni scholar based in Qatar. He heads the European Council for 
Fatwa and Research (ECFR) in Dublin. He also serves as the president of the International Association of 
Muslim Scholars (IAMS) in London. 
4 Muhammad Al-Yaqoubi is a Sunni Syrian scholar of Islamic theology, jurisprudence and hadith. He was one of 
the first scholars to speak against ISIS and his book Refuting ISIS is a testimony to that. He is listed in the 
world’s 500 most influential Muslims (2016 & 2017). His proficiency in English has drawn significant followers 
in Europe and the US.  
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they are false. As far as Sharīʿah is concerned, deliberation of the law has to be 
complemented with another dimension of Islamic science that seeks to comprehend the 
objective of divine law. This is known as Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah. If performing hijra is in 
compliance with Sharīʿah as claimed by ISIS, a critical enquiry of the concept from the 
perspective of Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah is essential. Since there has been no attempt to use this 
approach, this paper will offer an ideological rebuttal to counter ISIS’ call for hijra. It will 
also expose the ideological flaws in ISIS’ call for hijra which foreign terrorist fighters and 
sympathisers are unaware of.  
ISIS alludes hijra is a manifestation of true faith. The group asserts that it is 
religiously obligated upon Muslim to abandon a territory governed by non-Muslim or by 
Muslim administering manmade law. Relocating himself to a Sharīʿah-ruled state is an 
expression of al-walā’ wal barā’5 (Dabiq, 2015) thus there is a tendency to deliberate the 
creed of al-walā’ wal barā’ when addressing hijra. And because hijra was also used by other 
religiously motivated terror groups in the past the temptation to discuss hijra in the context of 
other jihadi group is persuasive. This essay, however, is not addressing hijra from that point 
of view due to two reasons. Firstly, any attempt to tackle the creed of al-walā’ wal barā’ 
within this study will only lead to another dimension. It will take the focus away from the 
central argument which is about Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah as a rebuttal tool to delegitimize ISIS’ 
claim of hijra in the name of Sharīʿah. The other reason is because religiously motivated 
Islamist group such as Al Qaeda casted the notion of hijra differently from the one of ISIS. 
The former’s manifestation of hijra was a reference to movement of fighters crossing borders 
to enter Afghanistan to fight alongside the Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War. 
Settling in Afghanistan was not the objective. ISIS, conversely, demands Muslims to reside in 
their controlled territories and help to build the state.  
Winter (2015) observes there are at least seven subsets to ISIS narrative projected 
through its media production. This includes religion, economy, social, justice, governance, 
                                                 
5 According to Ali (2015) the term “wala’ refers to the undivided loyalty Muslims should portray to God, Islam 
and their Muslim co-religionists over all other things, while bara’ refers to the disavowal of anything deemed un-
Islamic.” 
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territorial expansion and nature. This paper, however, is an attempt to tackle the religious 
aspect of the group’s hijra narrative. In addressing Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah, this study renders 
its focus to two out of six of its classifications in the early days of formulation; the 
preservation of one’s faith and soul (hifẓ ad-dīn wa an-nafs). This essay is presented in five 
sections. It begins with a brief overview of the notion of hijra from the lens of Islamic history. 
The second section examines the definition and the history of maqāṣid. The deliberation then 
proceeds to discuss on its classifications and how it responds to historical context. The crux of 
the discussion is offered in the fourth section which offers an analysis of the correlation 
between Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah and hijra and revisits and scrutinizes the jihadists’ notion of 
hijra. The final section will draw conclusions from the preceding discussions. 
 
The History of Hijra 
 
The first hijra came about as a result of persecution and ill-treatment of Muslims by 
Meccan Arabs. Prophet Muhammad’s clan and fellow Muslims experienced severe economic 
and social boycott. Ibn Hishām (1990) in his seminal book As-Sīrah An-Nabawiyyah noted a 
comment made by Ibn Ishāq that Prophet Muhammad was physically hurt, and accused of 
being a poet, a sorcerer and an insane man. Armstrong (2002) observed that the Quraysh clan 
had forbidden any marriage and trade with Muslims. Muslim slaves faced the harshest 
oppression. One of them was Bilal, an Abyssinian slave who was laid in the hot sun with a 
huge rock placed on his chest (Forward, 1997) in an attempt to revert him to his old faith. The 
family of Yaser (better known as Āl Yāser) was severely tortured, resulting in the death of his 
wife, Sumayya (Ibn Hishām, 1990). These ill treatments were the real reason why Prophet 
Muhammad suggested to a group of eighty-three Muslims (Ibid.) that they leave Mecca and 
seek refuge with Negus, a Christian king of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). 
Prior to the second hijra which was to Yathrib (Medina), Prophet Muhammad 
received multiple visits by groups of Medinans. An alliance was forged through two 
covenants of loyalty known as the Pledge of ‘Aqaba (Forward, 1997). The groups vowed to 
render support and protection to Prophet Muhammad and Islam. This paved the way for 
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Muslims to emigrate to Medina. As the numbers of Muslims secretly making their way to 
Medina grew, the Quraysh clan became more violent towards them, and plotted to assassinate 
the Prophet. This was the turning point leading to the Prophet’s emigration to Medina, 
accompanied by his closest friend, Abu Bakar. 
The above accounts clearly demonstrate that hijra was resorted to only after the 
escalation of violence against Muslims. Hijra emerged as a solution to preserve the basic right 
to practice one’s faith and to certain degree, protect one’s life. This is clearly reflected in the 
Quran: “To those who leave their homes in the cause of Allah, after suffering oppression - We 
will assuredly give a goodly home in this world; but truly the reward of the hereafter will be 
greater. If they only realized (this)!” (The Holy Quran, 16:41). Similar sense can be observed 
in another verse “He who forsakes his home in the cause of Allah, finds in the earth many a 
refuge, wide and spacious.” (Ibid., 4:100) In short, the long-term purpose of emigration was a 
strategic move to safeguard Islam’s survival. 
Historical accounts show that religious persecution was the main reason for the flight. 
Although earlier Muslims left Mecca for Medina and later formed an Islamic territory there, 
freedom of religious practice in Medina was not taken away from other faith groups. This is 
in stark contrast to ISIS’ practices and manipulation of the concept of hijra. This is evident 
when three Southeast Asian Muslims were featured in a video that shows them persecuting 
three men of other faith group (Jihadology, 2016). 
The group’s campaign on hijra is presented in several facades. Firstly, the 
responsibility to perform hijra is incumbent upon Muslims especially for the experts, 
professionals and specialists (Dabiq, 2014). This move to build and enhance the capacity of a 
newly established state is tied to the notion of religious obligation thus making it a form of act 
of worship (An-Naba’, 2016). Secondly, hijra is a solution to end Muslims’ slavery to a “kafir 
master” which is systematically engineered through employment (Dabiq, 2014). The group 
suggests that dignity can only be reclaimed if one chooses to live in ISIS-ruled territories and 
dedicate his life to Allah (Ibid.).  
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It is important to note that Muslims draw lessons from Quran and the Sunna, the two 
main source of Sharīʿah, for guidance. Every event or account is unique and hence, each 
receives different treatment as far as the Sharīʿah is concerned. Sharīʿah treats every event in 
a different way based on the context of its occurrence. This explains the verses in the Quran 
that order the oppressed Muslims to leave Mecca by justifying that Allah knows what is best 
for them at that point of time. “And their Lord hath accepted of them, and answered them: 
"Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he male or female: Ye are members, 
one of another: Those who have left their homes, or been driven out therefrom, or suffered 
harm in my cause, or fought or been slain,- verily, I will blot out from them their iniquities, 
and admit them into gardens with rivers flowing beneath;- A reward from the presence of 
Allah, and from His presence is the best of rewards."” (The Holy Quran, 3:195).  
The above account demonstrates that hijra was not required if a threat was not present. 
For example, not all Muslims left Mecca when the call for emigration was made because 
those who received guaranteed protection from abuse and harm remained. Abu Nu’aim an-
Nahham, a Muslim convert who took charge of orphans and widows of his tribe was one of 
them. He postponed his emigration because his tribe gave the assurance that his safety was 
protected. When he finally moved to Medina, Prophet Muhammad said to him “My people 
chased me out and wanted to kill me, while your people gave you the protection.” (Ibn Al-
Athīr, 2012). In the modern-day example, then Mauritanian Minister of Justice and also the 
present President of the Forum for Promoting Peace, Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah 
(Islamtoday, 2003) issued a religious edict asserting that hijra can be performed to a non-
Muslim state that upholds justice. This is also applicable to Muslims who experience threats 
against his life, wealth and religious practices albeit living in an Islamic state. The destination 
or host country, however, must be one that can alleviate these shortcomings.  
This is the distinction in the understanding of hijra between the majority of Muslims 
and ISIS. From the former’s standpoint, hijra is not a barometer of one’s faith. It is not even 
part of the five fundamental pillars of Islamic faith. Hijra is merely an option and is not 
required if the reasons for it not evident. Furthermore, even if the need arises, the destination 
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of hijra can be to any place that is conducive for one to practice his belief, or core Islamic 
practices at the very least. ISIS however, perceives hijra as a stepping-stone to armed struggle 
(Dabiq, 2014) which they loosely translate as jihad. The group also stressed that “abandoning 
Jihad is a trait of hypocrisy” (Ibid.). ISIS has also sought to mislead believers that since it is 
already established in Iraq and the Levant, it is incumbent upon Muslims to make their way 
there or to any of the “wilayat of the Khilafah”, and not elsewhere or to the lands of the 
Christians (Dabiq, 2015). ISIS asserted the urgency to build the caliphate’s capacity and 
capability through the emigration of professional Muslims to its controlled land. 
Unfortunately, its repudiation of “false borders” specifically the Middle East - pointing to the 
Sykes-Picot agreement - and its motto “bāqiyah wa tatamaddad” which means “forever and 
ever-expanding” are more prominent than the “ummah building” rhetoric. This demonstrates 
ISIS’ hijra campaign is heavily slanted toward supporting its quest for territorial expansion 
through military engagement vis-à-vis pro-violence stance. This “worldly” hijra aspiration 
does not align itself with the one of the Prophet. 
 
Introduction to Maqāsid 
 
Maqāṣid is the plural form of maqsid which means goal, intention and objective. 
Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah hence denotes the spirit behind Sharīʿah ruling. It illustrates what 
Sharīʿah seeks to achieve through its law. Kamali6 (2011) notes that pioneer scholars of 
maqāṣid such as Abu Hạmid al-Ghazali (d. 1111), ʿIzz al-Din ʿAbd al-Salam (d. 1262) and al-
Shatịbi (d. 1388) did not deliberate on its definition as they assumed the linguistic clarity of 
the word. Contemporary scholars, however, have formulated definitions to crystallize the idea 
further to supplement the growing literature on maqāṣid. This is necessary given the ever-
expanding dimension of maqāṣid in relation to new developments and challenges in life. 
Qaradawi (1973) for instance asserts that “Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah functions to attract benefits 
                                                 
6 Mohammad Hashim Kamali is an Afghan scholar. He taught Islamic Law and Jurisprudence at the 
International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM, 1985–2004); and was Dean of the International Institute of 
Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC, 2004–2006). Currently he is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic 
and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, a Senior Fellow of the Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan, and also 
Senior Fellow of the Royal Academy of Jordan.  
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to human being and distance them from harm and mischief.” Al-Zuhaili7 (2009) defines it as 
objectives, goals, results and the spirit that are attached to the Sharīʿah. Kamali (1999) notes 
that maqāṣid “largely concerned with the philosophy of the law, its outlook and objectives, 
rather than the formulation of its specific text” hence it received little attention during the 
early days of the development of Islamic legal thought. It is argued that the notion of maqāṣid 
is the end goal rather than conformity to what is prescribed by Sharīʿah. In explaining 
contemporary understanding of maqāsid, Auda8 (2008), a contemporary specialist on the 
subject, proposes maqāṣid as “a branch of Islamic knowledge that answers all the challenging 
questions of ‘why’ on various levels.” Here, one can ask for the reasons why some activities 
such as social drinking and crimes such as giving and receiving bribes are forbidden in Islam. 
Sharīʿah stresses that maintaining one’s senses through avoidance of intoxicants is paramount 
while accumulating wealth through crimes such as robbery and bribery is a cruelty and 
unjustifiable. Hence, they are forbidden and deemed sinful. 
Maqāṣid may also be understood through another dimension known as maṣālih or 
public interest. Auda (Ibid.) observed that several Islamic legal theorists such as Abd al-Malik 
al-Juwayni associated maqāṣid with ‘people’s interests (maṣālih)’ and even used the two 
terms interchangeably. Another prominent jurist Al-Qarafi (1994) linked the two by 
suggesting that “maqṣid is valid only if it complements towards the fulfillment of maṣlahah 
(singular for maṣālih) or the avoidance of some mischief (mafsadah).” Therefore, we can 
establish that maqāṣid seeks to identify the wisdom of Sharīʿah law which is to preserve 
                                                 
7 Wahbah Mustafa Al-Zuhaili was a Syrian Sunni scholar of Islamic law and jurisprudence. He authored many 
prominent books on fiqh and jurisprudence such as al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu (Islamic Jurisprudence and 
its Evidences), Athar al-Harb fi al-Fiqh al-Islami: Dirasa Muqarin (The Influences of War in Islamic 
Jurisprudence: A comparative study), Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (The Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence), al-
'Alaqat al-Dawli fi al-Islam (International Relations in Islam) etc.  
8 Jasser Auda is the Chairman of the Maqasid Institute, a global think tank based in London, UK. He is a 
Professor and Al-Shatibi Chair of Maqasid Studies at the International Peace College South Africa, and a 
Visiting Professor for the Study of Islam at Carleton University in Canada. He is also a member of the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research. He holds a PhD in the Philosophy of Islamic law from the University of Wales, 
UK, and a PhD in systems analysis from the University of Waterloo, Canada. He is known for his works in 
Maqasid and some of his contributions in this realm include: How do we realise Maqasid Al-Shariah in the 
Shariah? (2016); Rethinking Islamic law for Minorities: Towards a Western-Muslim Identity (2016); Maqasid 
Al-Shariah: A Beginner's Guide (2008); and Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems 
Approach (2008). 
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public interest. By definition, interest connotes both personal and communal dimensions. For 
instance, one should not pursue something that would only satisfy one’s interest but forsakes 
the interest of others including human, animal and even nature. Any effort to comply with 
rules but compromises the maqāṣid is hence unacceptable as it fails to appreciate the innate 
purpose of Sharīʿah itself. 
A critical analysis of the Quran and Sunna reveal that the wisdom of maqāṣid can be 
observed within the two fundamental sources of Islam. Numerous verses and hadith promote 
the preservation of goodness and eradication of evil in both private and public spheres. For 
example, the Quran states: “To each is a goal to which Allah turns him; then strive together 
(as in a race) towards all that is good.”(The Holy Quran, 2:148). Another verse states: “We 
sent aforetime our apostles with clear signs and sent down with them the book and the balance 
(of right and wrong), that men may stand forth in justice.” (The Holy Quran, 57:25). A hadith 
states: “He will not enter Paradise, whose neighbor is not secure from his evil conduct.” (Al-
Hajjaj, 2007). Kamali (1999) opines that except for the Zahiris9 who only acknowledge the 
maqāṣid if it is identified by clear text declaration, the majority of Muslim scholars maintain 
that the maqāṣid can be observed through identifiable causes and should not be confined to 
clear text alone as demonstrated in earlier verses and hadith. 
 
Classification of Maqāsid 
 
History shows that Sharīʿah was observed as a set of rule and value system during the 
early stages of Islam. It was introduced to facilitate order in the day-to-day interaction 
between people and to a certain degree, the rest of creation. The formulation of the theory of 
maqāṣid, however, only took place in the early fourth century when maqāṣid was critically 
deliberated by scholars of that era. Al-Juwayni (1979) made a significant contribution in this 
regard by becoming probably the first to classify Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah into three core 
                                                 
9 Zahiri is a school of Islamic law founded by Abu Sulayman Daud al-Zahiri in the ninth century. Flourished in 
Spain under the leadership of the jurist Ibn Hazm but extinct by the fourteenth century. Accepted the Quran, 
hadith, and consensus of the companions as the only sources of authority. Based its legal principles on a literal 
interpretation of Quran and hadith, rejecting analogy (qiyas), juristic preference (istihsan) and the use of reason 
in favour of revelation. 
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categories; the ḍarūriyyāt (necessities), the ḥājiyyāt (needs) and the taḥsīniyyāt 
(improvements). This is what was referred to by Auda (2008) as ‘level of necessity’. With 
this, according to the hierarchical order, ḍarūriyyāt is at the top of the apex of the maqāṣid 
pyramid followed by ḥājiyyāt and taḥsīniyyāt respectively.  
Darūriyyāt signifies necessities which demand a greater degree of compliance. It 
projects zero-tolerance towards anything that compromises the preservation of the five 
fundamental necessities coined by Al-Ghazali (1997) in his seminal work al-Mustaṣfā min 
ʿIlm al-Uṣūl. The five necessities are the preservation of one’s faith, soul, mind, offspring and 
wealth. This is what Hallaq10 (1997) was probably trying to assert when he noted that 
darūriyyāt “are absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of religious and mundane 
affairs” because Islam seeks to uphold the welfare of its followers in this world and the 
hereafter through its law vis-à-vis maqāṣid. A deficit in the implementation could lead to 
mischief and disorder.  
The following illustrations give a clearer picture concerning the preservation of the 
abovementioned necessities. In the protection of faith, the Muslim is required to perform 
religious obligations such as the daily prayers, the contribution of alms, fasting during 
Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca. If any of these are forsaken or barred from practice, it 
would negatively affect one’s devotion to Islam. With regard to preservation of life, Islamic 
teachings forbid indiscriminate killings of the innocent or non-combatants in peacetime and 
during war. On the protection of the intellect, Islam prohibits intoxicants, alcohol, banned 
drugs and the likes as they would seriously compromise one’s senses and impair one’s 
judgment. In respect of the protection of posterity, Islam prohibits premarital sex, adultery, 
casual sex and activities that are harmful to family life and future generations. The fifth and 
final necessity concerning the protection of wealth justifies the prohibition of theft, robbery 
and piracy and the need to maintain order to safeguard one’s property. It should be noted that 
                                                 
10 Wael B. Hallaq is a scholar of Islamic law and Islamic intellectual history. Some of his scholarly works 
include A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-fiqh (Cambridge, 1997); Origins 
and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge, 2005); and The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s 
Moral Predicament (Columbia University Press, 2013) which won Columbia University Press’s Distinguished 
Book Award for 2013-2015. 
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this understanding of maqāṣid was formulated during the early stages as a result of which the 
focus was heavily slanted toward preserving the welfare of the individual rather than society.  
Ongoing significant developments in human life and society demand a fresh response from 
maqāṣid. Consequently, some scholars added the preservation of “honor” as the sixth 
(Kamali, 1999). Ibn Taimiyyah expanded the notion by including the rights of neighbors 
(Ibid.). I would argue that this marks the beginning of the re-demarcation of the boundaries of 
maqāṣid from individual realm to a wider scale that includes the larger society. In 1993, 
Qaradawi is also suggesting freedom, justice and social welfare among the higher objectives 
of the Sharīʿah (Al-Qaradawi, 1993). In 2008, Auda also noted “the traditional maqāṣid 
classification did not include the most universal and basic values, such as justice and freedom, 
in its basic theory of levels of necessities.” He added that the “expansions of the scope of 
maqāṣid allows them to respond to global issues and concerns, and to evolve from ‘wisdoms 
behind the rulings’ to practical plans for reform and renewal.” (Auda, 2008). This paved the 
way for ‘universal maqāṣid’ to be introduced. Universal maqāṣid connotes the general world 
community including non-Muslims, animals and the environment. This is probably what Al-
ʿAlwani (2001) suggested by asserting there exist three elements in ‘supreme’ maqāṣid, one 
of which is “ʿimrān” or the development of civilization. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Auda’s impression of Classifications of maqāṣid in the early days of its 
formulation 
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The Maqāṣid – Hijra Nexus 
 
Sections two and three demonstrate how maqāṣid weighs in to achieve the desirable 
end state Sharīʿah law. Traditional Muslim scholars observed six types of necessities, the least 
that need to be preserved. Contemporary scholars on the other hand, applaud the idea that 
other than these six values, there should be an open-ended list of values that depart from 
individually-focused to society-centric values. In light of this development, I would argue that 
religiously-motivated behavior must correspond to and satisfy these values. A similar 
approach should be applied to examine the purportedly ‘religiously-evidenced’ arguments 
advanced by the likes of AQ, JI and ISIS, in particular, exploited concepts from religious texts 
and literature.  
As far as hijra in the early days of Islam is concerned, it was a response to uphold 
maqāṣid. These emigrations were necessary to preserve three of the six necessities in 
maqāṣid; the faith, soul and honor. Hijra was the only option in order to, firstly, continuously 
practice Islam, and secondly, avoid physical torture that could result in loss of life. A closer 
examination of this episode also reveals that Abyssinia offered more than just the preferred 
and safe temporary abode but that the land was ruled by a Christian ruler who was known for 
his good treatment of all people.   
Significantly this very first emigration settled at the Dār ul-Kufr or the land of non-
believers. This gives rise to two important points in discussing contemporary discourse over 
the choice of localities which Muslims should settle in. First, contrary to jihadist contention 
which proposes the binary perspective in observing a state as either Dār ul-Islām or Dār ul-
Kufr, the above historical account proves that Muslims are encouraged to stay in a locality 
where his rights to profess his belief are preserved and, where he will not be subjected to ill-
treatment or discrimination due to his religious orientation. Second, the potential destination 
for emigration should not be limited to a Muslim-ruled territory and one administered only by 
Sharīʿah law.  
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The former Grand Mufti of Egypt Shaykh Gad Al-Haq Ali Gad Al-Haq issued a fatwa 
or religious decree that affirmed the permissibility for Muslim to reside in any country that 
allows him to practice his creed. “If a Muslim feels that his religion is safe and he is able to 
practice it freely in a country that essentially has no religion or it accommodates religion other 
than Islam, it is allowable for him to stay. If he fears for his religion, morals, property or self-
worth, then it is obligatory for him to move to a country where he can be safe.” (Tubuliyak, 
1997). The spirit of the decree was later reinforced by Qaradawi (1993) who suggested 
maqāṣid should, among other considerations, promote freedom and justice, a criterion that 
parallels itself to article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). With 
Article 18 of the UDHR being practiced in most UN member states, there is a little need for 
hijra. The article in fact lays the foundation for maqāṣid-hijra-human rights nexus. 
I am of the view that the Grand Mufti decree and Qaradawi’s stance underscore the 
importance of living in a locality where religious tolerance and harmonious living are 
manifested at its best. The presence of religious persecution warrants one to relocate to a 
place where similar dangers or situations are not prevalent. However, this premise can be a 
double-edged sword and terrorist groups such as ISIS have been quick to exploit it by creating 
situations that compel Muslims to hijra. For instance, ISIS attacks countries such as America, 
Belgium and Indonesia even though these countries allow religious groups particularly 
Muslims to practice their belief. Among its reasons for doing so is to destroy the existing 
social fabric and create distrust and animosity among the citizens, specifically between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Any attack mounted in the name of Islam begets hate crimes 
against Muslims (as is already evident in the US, Europe and elsewhere). ISIS hopes that this 
backlash would create the impression among Muslims that they have no place in that society 
and impel them to hijra to ISIS-held territories. 
Similar to AQ and JI, ISIS legitimizes its claims and tries to garner Muslim support by 
relying on concepts that they distil from the two main sources of Islamic teachings, the Quran 
and the Sunna. In his post-9/11 speech, then Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden asserted that 
the rise of an Islamic state is dependent on five conditions, one of which is hijra (MEMRI, 
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2003). In Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah also placed hijra as one of its five founding 
principles (PUPJI English Translation, 2012). After conquering Mosul, ISIS focused on hijra 
as the main theme in its attempt to mobilise global Muslims to move to their newly “restored” 
Islamic state (Dabiq, 2014). 
Before we begin to analyze the maqāṣid-hijra nexus it is important to identify two 
types of arguments put forth by ISIS in its hijra rhetoric. First, hijra is obligatory upon “all” 
Muslims, and second, the destination of hijra is to Dār ul-Islām or the abode of Islam, which 
to ISIS, refers to the lands they control in Iraq and Syria (An-Naba’, 2016). The following 
paragraphs demonstrate the fallacy of the group’s arguments and give a clearer picture on 
how Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah is completely omitted in its arguments. 
 
Hijra as Religious Obligation 
 
Islamic rituals fall into two types, obligatory (Fardh) or voluntary (Nāfilat). According 
to ISIS, hijra falls under the former. The group asserts that “… hence every Muslim reserves 
his right to relocate (himself) to Dār ul-Islam and settle there.” (fa kullu Muslim lahū haqq fī 
al-intiqāl ilā Dār il-Islām wa al-iqāmat fīhā)(Ibid.). The group argues that relocating to ISIS 
is an act of worship in the cause of Allah: “Hijra in the cause of Allah is among the best form 
of worships that place the slave close to his Lord.” (al-Hijra fī sabīl Allah min afdhal al-
ᶜibādāt al-latī yataqarrabu bihā al-ᶜabd ilā mawlāhu)(Ibid.). Accordingly, Muslims should 
leave his country (especially in the Middle East) which was created based on Sykes-Picot 
“false border demarcation” (al-hudūd al-mustanaᶜat) (Ibid.) and make his way to ISIS to 
support the caliphate and redraw the border. The arguments above explain why some ISIS 
members’ burn their passports after reaching the territory safely (Al Hayat, 2014). ISIS also 
tries to persuade Muslims to migrate to its territory by declaring that those who do not 
perform hijra for whatever reason, to be a sinner (Dabiq, 2014): 
“Therefore, every Muslim professional who delayed his jihad in the past 
under the pretense of studying Shariʿah, medicine, or engineering, etc., 
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claiming he would contribute to Islam later with his expertise, should now 
make his number one priority to repent and answer the call to hijrah, 
especially after the establishment of the Khilafah. This Khilafah is more in 
need than ever before for experts, professionals, and specialists, who can 
help contribute in strengthening its structure and tending to the needs of 
their Muslim brothers. Otherwise, his claims will become a greater proof 
against him on Judgment Day.” 
ISIS insists that the barometer of one’s faith is measured through his willingness to break ties 
with his loved ones. Their understanding of this tenet is drawn from their literalist reading of 
the following hadith: “The Messenger of Allah said, “Verily Islam began as something 
strange, and it will return to being something strange as it first began, so glad tidings to the 
strangers.” Someone asked, “Who are the strangers?” He said, “Those who breaks off from 
their tribes.”(Dabiq, 2014). In its comment on this hadith, ISIS argues that “strangers are 
those who left their families and their lands, emigrating for the sake of Allah and for the sake 
of establishing His religion.” (Ibid.). 
 
The Response 
 
The argument that hijra would make a Muslim closer to God is inaccurate. If this is 
true, the Meccans and those who reside in the Holy Land would deserve this privilege by 
virtue of the location of the Ka’aba11 and the al-Haram Mosque. Prophet Muhammad was 
reported to have said “Whoever purifies himself (perform ablution) in his house and then 
comes to the mosque of Quba and prays in it will have a reward similar to performing the 
Umrah (small pilgrimage).” (Ibn Mājah, 2007). This suggests that one can attain the reward of 
an umrah by performing the ritual in the manner indicated by the hadeeth. We can conclude 
                                                 
11 Ka’aba is the cube covered in black silk cloth located at the center of the Al-Haram Mosque in Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia. It is the Qibla, a direction where Muslims turn to when performing their prayer (solat).  
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that the type and the quality of ritual could get one closer to God regardless of his 
whereabouts. Location is not a fundamental.  
It can also be argued that the hadith stating that Islam started as something strange and 
praising Muslims who are considered as “strangers”, cannot be used to coerce Muslims to 
perform hijra. Instead, the hadith should be read against the religious backdrop of 7th century 
Arabia. First, the assertion about Islam “being something strange” came about in the context 
of the Prophet warning Muslims that the religion would not be easily accepted given the 
conventional climate then that was alien to monotheistic belief. Those who subscribe to 
Islam’s monotheism would be seen as strangers. This was the reality then as Meccan Muslims 
observed Islamic teachings that were at variance with the common practices of polytheism 
and idolatry. In Quran “Say: O ye That reject Faith! I worship not what ye worship. Nor will 
ye worship that which I worship. And I will not worship that which ye have been wont to 
worship. Nor will ye worship that which I worship. To you be your way, and to me mine.” 
(The Holy Quran, 109:1-6).  
Re the second part of the text “Those who breaks off from their tribes”, the hadith 
seems to suggest severing ties with one’s tribes by performing hijra. I would argue that the 
hadith should be read in the light of the social change that was taking place during that time. 
For instance, a Muslim would distinguish himself from the other faith groups through his 
observance of religious obligations. His abandonment of the old religion (polytheism and 
idolatry) and adoption of a new one (monotheism) would appear strange in the sight of other 
faith groups. The hadith, therefore, was a directive for a new Muslim to detach himself from 
the religious practices of his tribes, not blood ties. 
It is also important to note that Muslims are obliged to maintain cordial relationship 
with family members with different beliefs, not “break off” relationship with them. The 
Prophet evidently manifested this teaching by treating his two paternal uncles Abu Talib and 
Abu Jahal with kindness although they refused to accept the calling to Islam. A literal 
approach in reading the hadith causes ISIS to miss the underlying message of maqāṣid. I 
concur that a convert must leave his past religious beliefs and practices behind upon his 
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conversion to Islam as this is in tandem with one of maqāṣid objectives, which is to preserve 
faith. This does not necessarily require one to leave his homeland and abandon his 
responsibility as a Muslim and a member of his community. This clearly contradicts what 
God said in Quran: “And remember We took a covenant from the Children of Israel, (to this 
effect): Worship none but Allah; treat with kindness your parents and kindred, And orphans 
and those in need.” (The Holy Quran, 2:83). The fallacy of ISIS’ hijra narrative from this 
standpoint is therefore self-evident in a context where Muslims are already practicing Islam 
freely in their locality. Their presence in their existing localities, in addition to maintaining 
family and community ties, are more needed than ever before as the spirit of maqāṣid in 
preserving faith could continue to be observed there. 
 
Hijra to Dār ul-Islām 
 
ISIS stressed that hijra from “dārul-kufr to Dārul-Islām” is obligatory (Dabiq, 2015). 
In one of its online propaganda, it states that “…it is compulsory upon Muslim to live in Dār 
ul-Islām, and he is permitted to travel within its provinces and cities, and he is forbidden to 
live in Dār ul-Kufr, and it is compulsory upon him (to abandon it) and emigrate to Dār ul-
Islām.” (idh yajibu ʿalā al-muslim al-iqāmat fī dār il-Islām, wa yajūzu lahu as-safar fī mā 
bayna aqṭārihā wa buldānihā, wa tuḥramu ʿalaihi al-iqāmat fī dār il-kufr, wa tajibu ʿalaihi 
al-hijra minhā ilā dār il-Islām.)(An-Naba’, 2016). This crystallizes ISIS position that 
Muslims today should leave his homeland, emigrate and live in the ‘real’ abode of Islam 
(Ibid.). ISIS attempts to give its own criteria of what is an Islamic state.  First, an Islamic state 
must be led by a caliph. Second, the state’s operations must be based solely on Sharīʿah law 
and not man-made laws. Third, there should be no political ties or peaceful relationship with 
Toghūt12 governments. Last but not least, Dārul ul-Islam is ever expanding; it does not 
recognize “false border” and neither does it recognize the notion of nationalism and nation 
state. Al-Baghdadi said “It is a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black 
                                                 
12 Toghut is Quranic term for false god or idol. Also applied to tyrannical rulers who arrogate God's absolute 
power and use it to oppress people. See http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2301 
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man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers.” (Dabiq, 2014). ISIS’ reinterpretation of 
Islamic state is significant because it delegitimizes other self-claimed Islamic countries such 
as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and even Iran whom, according to the group, have 
failed to project the true image of an Islamic state. It is obvious that ISIS wants to shape 
public perspective of what is an Islamic state and how it should behave in the international 
stage. ISIS also projects falsely how life was in Medina under the leadership of Prophet 
Muhammad. 
 
Response to ISIS 
 
First of all, the categorization of territories into these two groupings is ijtihadiy or an 
independent reasoning issued by learned scholars. Ijtihad is an instrument used to respond to 
contemporary religious, political, sociological and economic issues that have no ‘direct’ 
precedence in Islamic history, and nothing of similar nature can be drawn from the Quran and 
Sunna. Both these two primary sources of Islamic teachings do not classify a territory as Dār 
ul-Islām and Dār ul-Kufr. 
In discussing religious freedom and security in a certain locality, traditional Muslim 
jurists such as Abu Hanifah suggested two types of land and territory -- Dār ul-Islām, land 
ruled by Muslims and in which Islamic law is enforced or the opposite which is Dār ul-Ḥarb 
(abode of war) although war or situation that leads to war wasn’t imminent. The Hanafis also 
opined that the former could become the latter in the following situations: after conquest by 
unbelievers, when the conquered territory is adjacent to Dār ul-Ḥarb and the lives of Muslims 
and dhimmīs13 are endangered (Esposito et al., 1995). On the other hand, the majority of 
jurists from the three schools of thought such as Mālik bin Anas, Muhammad ibn Idrīs ash-
Shāfiʿī and Ahmad bin Hanbal  added Dār ul-ʿAhd (territory of truce) as the third type of 
                                                 
13 Non-Muslim but protected under Muslim treaty 
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territory. It sometimes reads as Dār ul-Ṣulh (territory of peace). Both referred to territory 
ruled by non-Muslims who have come into treaty with Muslim ruler.   
In relation to this, Abdallah bin Bayyah observes that “the land that is ruled according 
to non-Islamic laws and its residents are non-Muslims, is regarded today as – with little and 
infrequent exception – the land of peace. It was named as the land of peace due to 
international treaties that prohibit transgression”, (ad dār al latī taḥkumuhā qawānīn ghayra 
Islāmiyyah wa sukkānuhā ghayr al-muslimīn, fa hādhihī tuʿtabaru fī al-waqti al-hāḍiri – illā 
mā shadhdha wa nadira – heya dār muwādaʿat aw dār silmi, yutlaqu ʿalaihā dār silmi li 
wujūdi muʿāhadāti dawliyyah tamnaʿu al-iʿtidā’) (Bin Bayyah, undated). It can be safely 
presumed that almost all, if not in its entirety, United Nation member states adhere to this 
international norm. Because religious security and to some extent personal security were the 
cause of concern when the terms Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Kufr were first formulated 
centuries ago, the debate has practically lost its relevance today as the global community 
recognizes the freedom of professing religious belief and the right to live and be protected 
from danger. Hence, when a Muslim’s safety is protected by the law in a locality where he 
lives and he is not exposed to religious discrimination, the goal of maqāṣid  (of protecting 
one’s faith, soul, dignity and well-being) is clearly achieved without him limiting his choices 
of places to live. A Muslim can therefore choose to live anywhere as long the maqāṣid’s goal 
is within reach. This was the wisdom behind the order for earlier Muslims to leave Mecca for 
Christian-ruled Abyssinia because the territory upheld the abovementioned values.  
ISIS also attempted to strengthen their position on hijra by arguing that many Muslims 
made a mistake by choosing the land of the Christians when it comes to emigration. The 
group argues this was not the case when earlier Muslims settled in Medina after the second 
hijra and in the lands of the khilāfah after the establishment of the Umayyad and Abbasid 
Empire (Dabiq, 2015). Although the emigration did materialize, it is important to note that 
these mass emigrations were influenced by many factors. First, Muslims emigrating to 
Medina wanted to be closer to Prophet Muhammad to benefit from learning about Islam 
directly from the Prophet as part of strengthening and preserving their faith. Second, Medina 
  
 
 
 
 
Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman: Countering ISIS Call for Hijra. 
 
 
 
 
79 
promised religious freedom for all; for the first time Muslims were able to practice their faith 
publicly without fear of ill-treatment from others. Again, the element of maqāṣid was at play 
in this sense. Third, with regard to emigration to the land of Umayyad and Abbasid, it is 
argued that both lands were the center of gravity then. The caliphate and showing solidarity to 
the ruling caliph and governors were not the only reasons for mass emigration; other pull 
factors included social interactions, business opportunities and intellectual engagements. In 
fact, the peaceful coexistence of interfaith communities living under these caliphates as 
recorded in history could be one of the reasons of emigration of both Muslims and non-
Muslims to the caliphate. As Durant (1950) noted “As in most religions, the various sects of 
Islam felt toward one another an animosity more intense than that with which they viewed the 
"infidels" in their midst. To these Dhimmi - Christians, Zoroastrians, Sabaeans, Jews - the 
Umayyad caliphate offered a degree of toleration hardly equaled in contemporary Christian 
lands.” Again, as discussed in section three of this essay, maqāṣid, both in its traditional and 
contemporary understanding seeks to safeguard Muslims’ interest that at the same time 
radiates kindness to all. This is in stark contrast to ISIS’ atrocities toward non-Muslims, both 
within and beyond its territory. Hence, ISIS claim on the obligatory of hijra is far from the 
truth. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has argued that the two emigrations in Islamic history were the outcome of 
continuous ill-treatment targeted at earlier Muslims. In addition to recognizing the root cause 
of hijra in its classical sense, it is equally important to examine the events from the Maqāṣid 
Ash-Sharīʿah’s standpoint. This is essential in order to appreciate the wisdom of a prescribed 
Islamic law. ISIS, on the other hand, relies heavily on historical narrative and literal 
interpretation of religious texts to support their hijra propaganda. The group has total 
disregard of the importance of the maqāṣid dimension in this respect. In other words, they fail 
to convincingly answer the “why question: Why is hijra needed today when there is no 
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persecution of Muslims? Why are Muslims’ presence in the so-called “fabricated borders” 
more important than abandoning efforts built by earlier generations?  
ISIS’ hijra propaganda has appealed to some because it not only controls territories 
but also commands its own military, administers its own judicial system and most 
importantly, it is led by a ‘caliph’. This is a structure that very much resembles past Islamic 
caliphates and many would and have fallen for this misconception. However, as presented in 
this paper, not many are aware of the discourse of Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah, let alone its 
classifications and the development it had undergone in response to an ever-changing 
environment. If they are aware of Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah other than just Sharīʿah, they would 
be able to comprehend why ISIS’ call for hijra does not bear any weight. They will realize 
that ISIS’ call is not in congruent with the spirit of Sharīʿah. 
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